💸 "65 Euros for an Account Deletion Fail — When Deleted Doesn’t Mean Deleted"

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The Bug

I found a weird issue with the platform’s account deletion flow:

  • When a user deletes their account, their added email addresses were not removed from the system.
  • If the user tried to sign up again using the same email, they couldn’t — the system claimed the email was still in use.

Impact

  • Users locked out from re-registering after deleting their accounts.
  • Incomplete deletion = privacy issue (user data retained after account removal).

Status

  • Bug accepted ✅
  • Rewarded 65 Euros 💰

Key Lesson

Deleting an account should mean deleting everything tied to it, including secondary emails.
Half-baked deletion flows = low payout bugs, but solid finds.

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